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Abstract
This paper investigates poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), launched by the
International Monetary Fund/World Bank in 1999 as conditions for debt relief and
loans. It queries whether PRSPs really represent a shift away from the controversial
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changes with questionable impacts on poverty, such as liberalization and privatization,
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PRSPs is found to be unsatisfactory, as is ‘ownership’ of PRSPs by governments. This
paper stands as a critique of PRSPs and their assumed improvement on SAPs.
Keywords: poverty reduction, PRSP, structural adjustment programme, IMF,
World Bank, debt relief
JEL classification: O11, O19, F34, H50, I30UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
was established by the United Nations University as its first research and
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The purpose of
the Institute is to undertake applied research and policy analysis on structural
changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, to provide a
forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and
environmentally sustainable growth, and to promote capacity strengthening
and training in the field of economic and social policy making. Its work is
carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through
networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU/WIDER
Printed at UNU/WIDER, Helsinki
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of
any of the views expressed.
ISSN 1609-5774
ISBN 92-9190-062-1 (printed publication)
ISBN 92-9190-063-X (internet publication)
Acronyms
CSOs civil society organizations
ESAF enhanced structural adjustment facility
EU European Union
Eurodad European Network on Debt and Development
FDI foreign direct investment
GDP gross domestic product
HIPC highly indebted poor countries
IFI international financial institution
IMF International Monetary Fund
I-PRSP interim poverty reduction strategy paper
NGOs non-governmental organizations
ODA overseas development assistance
PRGF poverty reduction and growth facility
PRSC poverty reduction support credit
PRSG poverty reduction support grant
PRSP poverty reduction strategy paper
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
WTO World Trade Organization1
Executive summary
Poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) were launched by the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank at their annual meetings in September 1999. They replaced
structural adjustment programmes as the new pre-conditions for loans and debt relief
from both institutions.
PRSPs were supposed to mark a major shift. Borrowing countries were to design their
own development strategies, and these were to be more explicitly focused on poverty
reduction. The introduction of PRSPs was closely linked to the Highly Indebted Poor
Countries Initiative that provides debt relief, as a way of ensuring that debt relief really
went to the poor.
Only a handful of countries have actually completed a PRSP, while others have
produced an interim paper. The findings in this report are based on an examination of
four PRSPs and twelve interim documents, along with comments made by civil society
groups from developing countries.
The conclusions are not promising. The report finds that across highly indebted poor
countries, civil society groups are unsatisfied with the extent of public involvement in
drawing up the strategy papers. It also appears that government ownership of PRSPs is
weakened by the continued influence of the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank.
Most striking is the conclusion that the policy content of these strategies does not
constitute a major change from the past. This is particularly worrying given the
substantial body of evidence showing that structural adjustment programmes did not
reduce poverty.
Although the rhetoric in the strategies is poverty focussed, the actual policies included
do not have clear poverty reducing consequences. The strategies still focus on economic
growth without, on the most part, addressing how this growth is to be redistributed to
the poor. The core macroeconomic elements have changed little from the old structural
adjustment programmes with a continued adherence to privatization, liberalization and a
reduced role for the state.
Most of the poverty reduction strategies also fail to address adequately areas vital to
poverty reduction, such as gender analysis. They also lack ‘reality checks’ on the
domestic and global context.
The report concludes that if the mistakes of the past are not to be repeated, a critical
assessment of the predicted and actual impact of PRSPs on poverty is urgently needed.
1 Introduction
The lives of the poorest people around the world are being affected by poverty reduction
strategy papers (PRSPs). This is because PRSPs are now a condition of most grant aid
and concessional lending to the world’s 78 poorest countries.2
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are encouraging all rich-
country donors to link their assistance to poverty reduction strategies. The European
Union (EU) has already agreed to channel its funding through the poverty reduction
support grant which is tied to poverty reduction strategies.
This report investigates whether effective strategies for poverty reduction are being
developed. It looks at two aspects of PRSPs and interim-poverty reduction strategy
papers (I-PRSPs). Section 2 looks at the extent of public participation in, and country
ownership of, PRSPs and I-PRSPs. Section 3 examines the policies that have been put
forward in PRSPs and I-PRSPs.
The findings in this report are based on an examination of four PRSPs and twelve
I-PRSPs, along with a survey of commentaries made by civil society organizations
(CSOs) from over fourteen countries, on their experience of the PRSP process. Excerpts
from the PRSPs, I-PRSPs and CSO comments are presented in table form in Annex I. A
full list of references is in Annex III.
1.1 How have PRSPs come about?
Prior to 1999, in order to receive concessional lending from the IMF’s enhanced
structural adjustment facility (ESAF), highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) had to
agree to implement structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). In 1999, the IMF
replaced ESAF with the poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) and PRSPs were
introduced. In order to receive loans from the IMF’s PRGF, HIPCs are required to have
a PRSP or I-PRSP endorsed by the IMF and World Bank. Conditions for the loan are
drawn from the PRSP or I-PRSP.1
In addition to enabling countries to access IMF and World Bank loans, PRSPs are also
linked to the HIPC debt relief initiative. PRSPs set out how money saved through debt
relief will be spent on poverty reduction. In order to reach ‘decision point’, and gain
partial debt relief through the HIPC Initiative, countries need to have a PRSP or I-PRSP
agreed by the IMF and the World Bank. To reach ‘completion point’, and gain all the
debt relief for which they are eligible, countries need to have been successfully
implementing their agreed PRSP or I-PRSP for at least a year.
HIPCs want debt relief as soon as possible. Therefore, a tension has arisen between
countries wanting to make fast progress through the HIPC Initiative and taking the time
to produce a comprehensive PRSP. The IMF and World Bank have responded by
allowing HIPCs to produce I-PRSPs, which give a preliminary analysis of poverty and
provide a ‘roadmap’ towards completion of a ‘full’ PRSP. Endorsement of I-PRSPs
enabled a number of HIPCs to reach decision point in December 2000.
The IMF and World Bank are strongly encouraging other donors (e.g. bilateral donors)
to co-ordinate their aid through PRSPs, in the form of support to countries’ national
budgets, rather than discrete projects.
1 Loan conditions are set out in the ‘Letter of Intent’ and Memoranda of Understanding, which form the
agreement between a government and the lending institution.3
The European Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD) reports that the EU:
- fully endorses the PRSP approach;
- will base its programming for Asian, Caribbean and Pacific Countries, in the
context of the Cotonou Agreement, on the PRSP process; and
- will co-finance the World Bank’s new poverty reduction support credit, (through
the poverty reduction support grant), in conjunction with the IMF’s poverty
reduction growth facility.
1.2 What does a PRSP include?
The IMF and World Bank say a PRSP should set out a country’s comprehensive, long-
term plan to reduce poverty. It should include a diagnosis of the causes of poverty and
then the country’s strategy for combating poverty across different sectors, such as
macroeconomic policies, social sector investment and governance issues.
The IMF and World Bank state that the PRSP should include:
- poverty diagnostics;
- targets for selected intermediate outcome indicators;
- priority public policies to reduce poverty;
- monitoring and evaluation systems; and
- a participatory process (only required for PRSPs; I-PRSPs must give a
‘roadmap’ to the preparation of a full PRSP, showing plans laid for
participation).
The international financial institutions (IFIs) also suggest a list of questions that should
be considered when designing a PRSP, for example:
- What are the obstacles to more rapid growth and to spreading the benefits to the
poor?, and
- What are the priority public policies to increase growth and reduce poverty?
1.3 How should PRSPs be assessed?
Appointments, trips, honours, elections, third term debates etc should be
evaluated on the basis of this single overriding question: what
consequences will this have on dealing with the life or death of 82 per
cent of the population who live below the poverty line? (quoted in
Kaunda 2001).
This report asks whether PRSPs and I-PRSPs will achieve poverty reduction. Or, since
I-PRSPs are only ‘roadmaps’, and PRSPs themselves are supposed to be iterative, at
least whether they seem to be heading in the right direction to reduce poverty.
Implementation of PRSPs began in March 2000, so evidence on the ground of their
impact is limited. Nevertheless, past experience of structural adjustment policies (SAPs)
and critical analysis gives a basis for argument.4
The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs)
surveyed for this report have followed the work of the IMF and World Bank closely for
many years. They share a critique of the policies and advice offered by IFIs, based on
the actual experience of poor communities. Where possible, they have tried to put
forward constructive proposals that would lead to improvements for poor people.
There is a consensus among these organizations that the policies in SAPs failed to
reduce poverty and that alternative policies are needed to make a real difference to the
lives of poor people. If PRSPs mimic SAPs, they fear PRSPs are also likely to fail.
If one PRSP looks a lot like a standard IMF reform package—with a
larger social protection budget—that doesn’t necessarily prove that
alternative policies were ignored. But if most of them—or all of them—
have that familiar laundry list of macro and institutional reforms, then
there’s a real problem. If the Bank and Fund will only ‘endorse’ PRSPs
that fit into a preconceived box of standard policies, then it’ll be just one-
size-fits-all adjustment lending with a politically correct name (Kessler
2000).
1.4 What was wrong with structural adjustment programmes?
Prior to 1999, countries had to implement SAPs in order to access concessional loans
from the IMF and World Bank. SAPs were characterized by:
- an emphasis on economic growth;
- tight monetary discipline and a reduction in inflation;
- wide-ranging privatization and liberalization;
- charging for basic services; and
- withdrawal of the state from production and marketing.
The IFIs have not formally evaluated the impact of SAPs on people in poor countries.
However, there has been sustained criticism of SAPs for the problems they caused for
poor people, from NGOs, CSOs, academics and UN agencies. In the year 2000, fifty
separate incidents of civil unrest were reported across thirteen poor countries, as
ordinary people took to the streets to protest against SAPs (Woodroffe and Ellis-Jones
2000).
Criticisms of SAPs included:
- lack of promotion of sustainable economic growth;
- increased inequality within countries;
- tight monetary policies which led to reduced government spending resulting in
redundancies, salary freezes, and cuts in basic service provision;
- raised interest rates, to tackle inflation, which led to small companies going out
of business;
- privatization which resulted in increased unemployment and loss of services to
poor areas;5
- currency devaluation and export promotion which led to increased costs of
imports, land being used for export crops (reducing food security) and increased
reliance on international commodity prices;
- removal of price controls which led to rapid price rises for basic goods; and
- a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, insensitive to countries’ particular circumstances.
These criticisms will be explored further in section 3.
2 Participation and country ownership
The failure of SAPs to reduce poverty was blamed, in part, on the lack of ‘ownership’ of
the programmes by the countries implementing them. Now ownership has become an
important part of the rhetoric surrounding the preparation of poverty reduction
strategies. When the IFIs talk of country ‘ownership’, they usually mean how
committed governments are to implementing the strategy.
How far the people of a country ‘own’ their strategy, and to what extent the people of a
country are able to participate in the drawing up of that strategy, have been concerns
since PRSPs were first launched. Now that some PRSPs have been agreed, and many
others are nearing completion, it is important to investigate these concerns.
2.1 What is the extent of public participation?
It’s simply dishonest for the multilateral lenders to declare that
participation is a key to poverty reduction, and then tell civil society to
go complain to their own government if it doesn’t happen (Kessler
2000).
Participation is a requirement for full PRSPs. Governments do not have to show
participation in the drafting of I-PRSPs, but since I-PRSPs set the agenda and context
for the development of full PRSPs, having an influence from the beginning is believed
to be very valuable by CSOs.
The experiences of CSOs outlined in Table 1 (Annex I) give a picture of the extent of
public participation in the drawing up of PRSPs and I-PRSPs so far.
CSO comments range from cautiously optimistic to outraged and disappointed, and
cover a range of issues. The extent of CSO involvement in PRSPs and I-PRSPs has
certainly been very varied across countries. The International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) claims that in countries as diverse as Ecuador and Uganda,
unions have not been satisfied with the extent of their inclusion in preparing PRSPs and
I-PRSPs.
The common problems expressed are:
- lack of timely involvement and rushed processes;
- lack of information generally, and specifically on macroeconomic/fiscal issues;6
- exclusion from discussion of parts of the strategy e.g. macroeconomic policy
choices;
- information not provided in an accessible language;
- cost of organizing participation and involvement of only a limited number of
CSOs;
- lack of feedback on, and incorporation of, CSO comments;
- ‘consultation’ rather than ‘participation’; and
- overstated claims by governments for CSO involvement.
Some CSOs believe that even the way the IFIs have structured PRSPs compromises
poverty reduction. This does not encourage them to engage with it. Nevertheless, in
some countries, new and valuable space for involvement of CSOs has been opened up.
2.1.1 Participation and politics
What the IFIs’ and donors’ newly found enthusiasm for ‘participation’ has perhaps
overlooked, is the concept that participation is inevitably political. So far, the IFIs
appear to have seen participation as a simple, technical issue. But the choice of who is
invited, or allowed, to participate in the design of a poverty reduction strategy is an
innately political decision, as an example from Kenya demonstrates.
In Kenya’s The Nation, Washington Akumu (2001) tells how in the past, preparation of
a ‘representative’ PRSP led to division within the government. In 2000, two groups
battled for control of the process: one favouring broad civil society participation fronted
by treasury officials and civil society activists; the other, based around officials in the
president’s office, favoured consultations carried out under the auspices of existing
bodies. When the Treasury put forward an interim list of 25 districts selected for public
consultation hearings, it was rejected by the President’s office as insufficiently
representative. Interestingly, the majority of districts were opposition strongholds! In
the end all districts were included.
The UNDP also warns of the complexities of putting participation into practice:
The challenge of tackling social inequalities and poverty is a major
governance concern. It entails dealing with basic conflicts over rights
and entitlements … It brings up a discussion of the extent to which social
disparities are the fault of domestic politics. Tackling poverty is first and
foremost a political issue, not a technical one (UNDP 2000).
The term ‘participation’ is much used in the PRSP process. It is applied to a wide
spectrum of approaches, ranging from merely informing the public to ensuring that
people’s views are incorporated in final strategies. The discontent of CSOs with the
extent of participation has a significant bearing on the degree to which the PRSPs and I-
PRSPs can be held to be country ‘owned’.7
2.2 Do countries own their strategies?
A finance minister has said of his country’s poverty reduction strategy:
We do not want to second guess the Fund. We prefer to pre-empt them
by giving them what they want before they start lecturing us about this
and that. By doing so, we send a clear message that we know what we
are doing—i.e. we believe in structural adjustment (Cheru 2001).
A major criticism of SAPs was that the IFIs imposed economic policies on the
governments and peoples of poor countries. They paid scant regard to the particular
historical and economic context of individual countries, and usurped the role of national
governments.
The IFIs’ intention is that PRSPs should avoid these mistakes. Rather, poor country
governments should devise their own strategies, with the participation of civil society.
Table 2 sets out CSO comments on national ownership of PRSPs.
Concerns include:
- strength of the role of the IFIs and other donors in the drawing up of strategies
and the drafting of texts;
- use of foreign consultants;
- setting of parameters by, and perceived lack of flexibility of, the IMF and World
Bank;
- perception of PRSPs as something to be done to please creditors and donors and
thereby secure new funding;
- lack of transparency of discussions and the relative extent of involvement of
government officials, parliament, CSOs and IFIs in different parts of strategies;
- relationship between PRSPs / I-PRSPs and loan conditions.
The logic here is that since PRSP is the brainchild of the IMF itself and a
key to accessing its loans … Demonstration of government goodwill and
support for the process is seen as key to the successful completion of the
process whose ultimate aim is the drafting of a blueprint acceptable to
the lenders (Akumu 2001).
Some PRSPs and I-PRSPs draw explicitly on existing national plans, for example
Uganda’s poverty eradication action plan and Ethiopia’s agricultural development led
industrialization strategy. However, these plans had to be reformatted and rewritten in
order to qualify as PRSPs.
However, the IFIs did not accept Mozambique’s pre-existing poverty reduction action
plan as the basis for a PRSP document, because they believed its preparation had been
insufficiently participatory. It is questionable whether the IFIs’ demand for new
documents, when poverty reduction plans already exist, enhances country ownership.8
Questions are also raised by the IFIs’ demands for PRSPs and I-PRSPs to be produced
to fit into their own timetables rather than a country’s normal planning cycle.
The IMF’s executive board recently debated concerns that the IMF’s loan conditions
were overstepping its mandate and expertise, and that IMF-supported programmes
sometimes short-circuited national decision-making processes. Directors decided that
there was a need to streamline and focus conditionality. Nevertheless they agreed that
IMF financing should only be provided, ‘if those policies that are essential to the
purposes of the Fund continue to be implemented’ (IMF 2001a). This raises questions
over the extent of the IMF’s influence on policy choices.
If the PRSPs are to be successful, they need to be backed by people throughout the
country, beyond even government officials and CSOs, because ‘Poverty reduction is
intrinsically a long-term process well beyond the electoral mandate of most
governments ...’ (UNDP 2000).
This calls for transparency and country-wide debate.
2.3 Summary for section 2: participation and country ownership
This survey has found that participation by civil society in the design of countries’
poverty reduction strategies is currently inadequate, and that country ownership of these
strategies is insufficient. In practice, both participation and ownership fall short of the
IFIs’ theoretical aspirations. This is partly because these issues are highly political; not
merely technicalities as the IFIs seem to have assumed. In future, as experience grows,
participation may increase, but what will happen in the area of country ownership is less
clear. This has serious implications both for the nature of the policies put forward in the
PRSPs and I-PRSPs and for the implementation of these policies.
3 Policies chosen in poverty reduction strategies
Many different approaches to development exist. A World Bank study (Gerster 2000: 9)
has described four:
i) Market-based ‘pro-poor’ growth: a modified version of the orthodox neoliberal
economic model, in which the benefits of economic growth are expected to
trickle-down to poor people;
ii) Sustainable livelihoods: a focus on reducing the vulnerability of the majority
of the poor through interventions in agricultural production, income
diversification and rural infrastructure;
iii) Resource redistribution of both physical and social assets—based on the
analysis (UNDP 1998: 42-7) that inequality is directly negatively correlated to
economic growth and that inequality slows poverty reduction;2, 3
2 The World Bank increasingly acknowledges that asset and income inequalities are possible constraints
on growth and poverty reduction. Yet it also admits, ‘[s]ome increase in income inequality in the9
iv) Rights-based, relying on empowerment and a redistribution of political
power.4.
This survey of PRSPs and I-PRSPs demonstrates that overall, the market-based ‘pro-
poor growth’ model dominates, although elements of the three other approaches are
evident in some of the strategies.
For example, Burkina Faso (RPSP 2000: 22) claims its development vision is based on
a concept of human security, which is analogous to the rights-based approach. It is
defined as giving each Burkina Faso national access to:
- economic security, which depends on access to education, vocational training
and paid employment;
- health security, which depends on access to low-cost preventative and curative
medical care;
- food security, which depends on access to basic food stuffs and safe water;
- environmental security, which requires the preservation of a healthy
environment; and
- individual and political security, which requires the application of principles of
good governance, namely the primacy of law, responsibility and participation,
efficiency and transparency.
It is not always easy to see how this ambitious vision is followed through in the policies
put forward in the PRSP. Many countries’ PRSPs and I-PRSPs include policies to
improve rural infrastructure and rural agricultural production, as in the sustainable
livelihoods approach, but generally these are couched within a market-based
framework.
3.1 What policies are in the strategies?
3.1.1 Macroeconomics
Macroeconomic policy direction
Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs given in Table 3. Core policies across all countries
are:
- economic growth (variously described as accelerated, rapid, strong, sustainable,
equity-based, broad-based);
region, even in the long run, is probably an unavoidable consequence of the introduction of market-
based rewards’. Demery/Walton 1998 and World Bank 1999a, cited in Gerster 2000: 4.
3 Gerster cites both the Inter American Development Bank and a major Norwegian evaluation of the
World Bank in Africa, as stressing that poverty reduction efforts will have to include redistributive
policies. Thus, ‘[a] better distribution of assets to include the poor would not only increase their
incomes, reducing poverty directly, but it would also increase aggregate growth by reducing the
negative effect on growth of income inequality’. Birdsall (1997) cited in Gerster (2000: 14).
4 ‘Empowerment of the poor must be the starting point. Without empowerment, poverty eradication is
not possible and even efforts of poverty alleviation may well not be sustainable’. Jolly (1999) cited in
Gerster (2000: 17).10
- macroeconomic stability;
- prudent monetary/fiscal/budgetary policies;
- structural reforms: both liberalization and privatization; and
- development of, or enabling environment for, the private sector.
Growth and inflation aspirations
Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs given in Table 4. Countries are consistently aiming
for economic growth rates of between 5 and 7 per cent and planning to keep inflation
below 5 per cent.
Liberalization and external competitiveness
Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs given in Table 5. Core policies across all countries
are:
- liberalization/deregulation/elimination of price controls (e.g. gas, cotton,
petroleum, transport, electricity, water, telecommunications, seeds, financial
sector, capital);
- rationalization of tariffs, reduction of barriers to trade;
- integration into the global economy, increased competition and export
orientation; and
- opening to/promotion of foreign trade and foreign direct investment.
Privatization and courting of private sector
Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs given in Table 6. Core policies across all countries
are:
- privatization (e.g. telecommunications, energy, cotton, textiles, public
enterprises, railways, ports, airports, seed, electricity, oil, gas, water, banking,
sugar factories, meat, parastatal reform, pipelines, transport - including air and
water, mining);
- withdrawal of the state from productive activities and marketing;
- expansion of the role of the private sector/making the private sector the engine
of growth;
- stimulation of private investment (e.g. in infrastructure/utilities, production,
marketing, agriculture, tourism); and
- efficient delivery of services to the private sector/removal of constraints on the
private sector.
The consistency of policies put forward in the PRSPs and I-PRSPs is remarkable, given
the different histories, characteristics and drafting processes of the sixteen countries
surveyed. The general thrust of the macroeconomic policies found in the PRSPs and I-
PRSPs seems very similar to that of standard SAPs in the past.
For all PRSPs and I-PRSPs macroeconomic stability is important, but there is little
reference to the debate that rages over the benefits of growth, and the different types of
growth. The vocabulary in some of the strategies signals a commitment to a type of11
‘pro-poor’ growth (‘equity-based’, ‘broad-based’), but often this seems only to extend
to the rhetoric, and not the reality of the policies chosen.
3.1.2 Problems with PRSPs’ market-based approach to macroeconomic policies
Most HIPCs have already experienced some years of SAPs. The poverty diagnoses at
the start of the PRSPs and I-PRSPs frequently state that poverty exists because the
country did not follow, or followed inadequately, the neoliberal economic model
promoted through the SAPs, by the IFIs. Some strategies do comment cautiously on the
failure of their country’s SAP to reduce poverty. However, more often than not, an
endogenous cause is then found to take the blame.5, 6 Is this a display of deference to
the IFIs?
Policies to encourage fast economic growth and low inflation, liberalization and
privatization were at the centre of SAPs. All these policies are put forward in PRSPs
and I-PRSPs, mostly without much discussion of how they were decided upon, or what
trade-offs are involved.
Macroeconomic policy direction
The emphasis on market-based growth is of concern to the NGOs and CSOs surveyed,
given their previous experience of SAPs based on the same neoliberal economic model.
In Kenya, for example, CSOs criticized the second draft of the Kenyan PRSP, saying its
anti-poverty content was unacceptably weak, and blaming this on adherence to the
traditional neoliberal market model:
Holding to the trickle down theoretical framework prevents an
entitlements-approach to budgeting from emerging. Previous relief
(safety nets) and economic growth (trickle down) based approaches over
the nineties have failed to arrest the systematic condition of widespread
poverty, rights denial and poor public accountability ... There is a need to
define citizens’ core entitlements and cost these within an enabling
policy framework (Houghton 2000).
Growth and inflation
The growth rates in many PRSPs and I-PRSPs seem overly optimistic compared with
rates achieved in recent years, and in view of predictions for a slow-down of the global
economy. The PRSPs and I-PRSPs emphasis low inflation. One way of keeping
inflation down is to rein in public expenditure. Although spending on education and
health is set to increase, there is little consideration of the negative consequences for the
poor, of reducing public expenditure in other areas.
5 ‘Despite recent efforts in the macroeconomic front, Zambia has not yet experienced sustained rapid
economic growth necessary for reducing poverty, partly because the key measure of privatizing the
mining industry was only just recently undertaken’.(Zambia’s I-PRSP para 22).
6 ‘Madagascar has been undergoing structural adjustment for about 20 years with mixed results, results
undoubtedly determined by political practices and special historical circumstances ... To date
Madagascar is among the group of the poorest countries… Hence, the justified dissatisfaction or even
helplessness face to a persistent shocking poverty despite definite improvements of macroeconomic
indicators’ Madagascar’s I-PRSP (2000: 1).12
Over-tight control of expenditure can also contradict policies which aim to increase
growth rates and boost the private sector, for example:
It can limit the public investment budget, and thereby the supply of key
public goods essential to private sector growth and employment
generation … (this can lead to) both lower growth and slower social
recovery ...
It can constrain the government’s ability to provide essential recurrent
expenditures … this reduces the private and social returns to
infrastructure investment …
It forces governments to raise taxation in ways that harm growth
(Addison 2000).
Liberalization and privatization
The direct consequences of liberalization and privatization policies for poverty
reduction are rarely clearly articulated. Despite this, the policies are almost exclusively
presented as beneficial. Discussions of consequences that could harm the poor, such as a
reduction in safety standards as a result of competition, or unemployment resulting from
privatization-induced ‘down-sizing’, are absent. Also missing are comments on
countries’ absorption capacity for foreign direct investment.
The poverty diagnoses of PRSPs and I-PRSPs invariably find that poverty is
predominantly a rural phenomenon, with small farmers constituting a sizeable
proportion of the poor. Past experience has shown that these farmers have not benefited
from liberalization and privatization. Rather, these policies have led to rising costs of
inputs and loss of access to credit.
For example, an evaluation of World Bank country assistance to Tanzania (1998-2000)
states that the World Bank’s strategy failed to address the factors constraining long-term
growth in agriculture. Its strategy ‘appeared to be based on the assumption that once
prices were liberalized and parastatals dismantled, the private sector would step in
automatically to fill the vacuum. This has not occurred’ (World Bank 2000: 21).
Another World Bank study found that greater openness to trade was negatively
correlated with income growth among the poorest 40 per cent of the population
(Lundberg and Squire 1999).
Views of CSOs on macroeconomic polices of PRSPs and I-PRSPs
From Bolivia:
The struggle against poverty is framed by the structural adjustment
programme and as such its results depend upon what can be obtained
from the currently enforced model. According to the perspectives
indicated in the preliminary document the macroeconomic indicators are
very good (average growth rate of 5 per cent, rate of investment 21.7 per
cent GDP, fiscal deficit reduction, reactivation of the mining sector, etc.),
nevertheless, after 15 years of structural adjustment, and with similar
macroeconomic indicators, poverty had not been reduced. (Jubilee 2000
Bolivia).13
From Cambodia:
Civil society organizations recognize that economic growth is desirable
and is necessary for development. High growth, however, comes with
huge social and environmental costs, and exposes the economy to
vulnerabilities. Moreover, high growth does not necessarily address the
issue of inequality, and even push(es) some sectors further into poverty
(Malaluan 2000).
From Kenya:
The second draft of the I-PRSP was disappointing in many respects.
Despite clear causal analysis for government failure, poverty and gross
inequalities, the NGO memorandum noted that ‘the medium-term goals
fail to make poverty reduction the centre of the economic recovery and
growth strategy’. Preoccupation with traditional macroeconomic and
governance targets currently suffocates the strategy. It crowds out anti-
poverty content leaving a discredited trickle-down theoretical framework
(Houghton 2000).
From Nicaragua:
For many years we have been forced to believe and implement the
‘strategy’ that says economic growth is the engine to confront poverty in
the South. The growth now named ‘pro-poor’ by the international
financial institutions, still focuses on macroeconomic management with
freer and more open markets. The result, however, of such ‘economic
growth’ has increased the gap between rich and poor, and North and
South; and it is due to the unjust distribution of income and opportunities
and over-exploitation of the South’s resources and peoples (Alizaga
2000).
From Tanzania:
Specific reform measures such as liberalization of trade, privatization,
fiscal austerity, retrenchment and cost-sharing have been adopted as
universal formula in all African countries, without taking into account
specific differences and probable impact on the poor, women and youth.
They have been imposed without proper preparation and formulated in
an undemocratic fashion, without full participation of all segments of
society. One example is the withdrawal of the state from economic
activities, privatization, and retrenchment within government and state
parastatals. The result has been increased unemployment and the drastic
decline of formal sector wage employment, leaving the majority of
people—and the national economy as a whole—increasingly dependent
on the under-resourced informal sector. Increased poverty rates can be
directly attributed to these policies … (Tanzania Coalition on Debt and
Development 2000).
Key economic reform and structural adjustment policies were negotiated
outside of the PRSP process and without the knowledge and participation
of citizens’ groups,14
and, ‘The IMF set an inflation target of less than five per cent (Tanzanian
Gender Networking Project)’.
3.1.2 Social policies
Lack of access to basic services is a widely used definition of poverty. All the PRSPs
and I-PRSPs surveyed emphasize the importance of increased spending on basic
services for poverty reduction. All the strategies state that their aim is to increase the
access of the poor to education, health and clean water, in terms of both
quantity/coverage and quality. However, there are very serious concerns over the
continued use of cost recovery schemes/user fees, which have been shown to reduce the
access of poor people to basic services. Measures included to help the poor meet
payment requirements seem inadequate.
Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs on education, health and water policies relating to
cost recovery and user fee schemes are in Table 7.
The continued reliance on cost recovery/user fee schemes, revealed in the PRSPs and I-
PRSPs is surprising given the degree of consensus around the problems they cause the
poor. The USA even has a bill requiring it to oppose any IMF, World Bank or regional
development bank loan that includes user fees or service charges for poor people, for
primary education or primary health care.7
Views of CSOs on the social polices in PRSPs and I-PRSPs
The following comments from the Tanzanian Gender Networking Project are
representative of concerns expressed by CSOs in other countries.
Education
In general, the position of gender groups and many CSOs is that
unconditional withdrawal of user fees in the areas of health, education
and water is necessary. It is in these sectors that vulnerable
groups, … have been impacted greatly: these sectors also are the arenas
in which the government could have most positively helped these groups.
In terms of the decision to abolish user fees at the primary school level,
while we understand that the government is constrained, we contest that
removing user fees at only one level is not sufficient and not sustainable.
Even if this decision opens up the opportunity for primary education to
more students, which is not clear in and of itself, this creates an even
wider gap between the number of students attending primary school and
those attending secondary school. This gap has implications for
increasing inequalities in terms of both gender and class.
In general, in order to encourage equality of opportunity in education,
user fees must be eliminated at the secondary school and other levels.
These fees contribute to the continued marginalization of groups and a
disadvantaged status between boys and girls, urban and rural, rich and
poor … Research by Katunzi and Sumra (1991) and TADREG (1996)
7 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill adopted 25 October 2000, Financial Year 2001.15
showed that the cost-sharing policy has hit hardest boys and girls from
low-income families … .
The strong recommendation, put to the government before the PRSP was put forward
for approval, was that ‘cost-sharing interventions should be eliminated at the primary
and secondary levels within the PRSP’. They were not.
Health
… there is an increased move towards privatization and the public health
sector is increasingly deprived of vital funds. In this process
marginalized groups are increasingly impacted. The government needs to
get rid of the user fees in the health sector …
… we do not believe the user fee policy in Tanzania is functioning.
There is evidence … indicating that pregnant women and rural poor are
unable to access crucial medical services, although these groups are
supposedly exempted…
The strong recommendation, put to the government before the PRSP was put forward
for approval, was that ‘what we need is the abolition of user fees for health, education
and water sectors …’
Private sector
A number of PRSPs refer to increasing the involvement of the private sector in the
provision of basic services, such as education, health and water supply. But the Bolivian
I-PRSP sounds a warning note about low economic returns that may reduce private
sector enthusiasm.
The public investment programme proposed by the government focuses
on health, basic sanitation, housing, education, rural development and
infrastructure that cannot be carried out by the private sector due to the
low economic return despite its high social return (Bolivia’s I-PRSP
2000: 3).
CSOs resolutely denounce charging for basic services, and sound alarm bells over the
involvement of the private sector in education, health and water provision. Past
experience predicts that both policies lead to reduced access to services by the poor.
3.1.3 Governance and public sector reform
The IFIs’ and donors’ increasing concern with ‘good governance’ is demonstrated by an
increase in conditions in this area. Table 8 gives a picture of the policies adopted in
PRSPs and I-PRSPs.
Core policies, across all countries are:
- ‘good governance’;
- democratization;
- decentralization of government functions;
- civil service reform and down-sizing;16
- anti-corruption drives;
- reducing and rolling back the state;
- strengthening the judiciary and ‘rule of law’; and
- creating enabling environment for private sector.
Many of the policies advocated in the PRSPs and I-PRSPs sound as if they will benefit
the poor. However, whether the policy choices are based on ‘advice’ from the IFIs, or
analysis of what is required for poverty reduction, is not always clear.
Some creditors suggest governance reforms must come first, to lay the foundation for
poverty reduction, while some CSOs say that poverty reduction must be the basis for
effective reform.
For example, the Kenyan NGO working group on the second preliminary draft of the I-
PRSP advocated replacing, ‘the paradigm of poverty reduction as an outcome of
effective governance reform with poverty reduction and economic growth as the basis
for effective government reform’. They held this nuance to be ‘simple, but very critical’.
3.1.4 Problems with governance policies in PRSPs and I-PRSPs
Democratization
Parliamentarians have complained of being by-passed in the drawing up of PRSPs and
I-PRSPs, which is not healthy for the promotion of democracy. NGOs and CSOs have
also expressed concern that the PRSP process should include due parliamentary
scrutiny. Kenyan NGOs specifically called for the PRSP to ‘be tabled in parliament for
approval’ (Kenyan NGO working group 2000: 4).
Decentralization
Decentralization of government functions is an extremely common policy in PRSPs and
I-PRSPs. It is offered as a way of bringing decision-making closer to the people affected
and thereby increasing accountability. But decentralization does not automatically give
a voice to the poor. As the UNDP notes, decentralization does not address the issue of
the ‘inability of the weaker segments of the population to make their voice heard in the
face of elite domination of the traditional power structures’ (UNDP 2000: 3).
There are also human capacity problems. Can enough trained administrators be found to
work in decentralized offices, particularly in the context of frequently mentioned skills
shortages and civil-service downsizing plans?
Civil service reform
The extent of downsizing proposed in some countries is large (e.g. Kenya 48,000
redundancies out of a staff of 220,000). Increased efficiency is a laudable goal, but the
number of people who may be thrust into poverty as a result of unemployment is a
concern.
Fighting corruption
Fighting corruption is increasingly on the IFIs’ and donors’ agenda. In many PRSPs and
I-PRSPs, state divestiture/privatization is offered as a way of fighting corruption. But is17
this realistic? After all, the process of privatization itself offers plenty of opportunities
for corrupt practices, and the private sector is not inherently free of corruption.
Rolling back the state
Some commentators are concerned about a disconnection between people and their
government, as governments increasingly divest themselves of any role in the economy,
beyond regulation. This is compounded by the perception of governments as heavily
influenced by IFIs and other donors.
Strengthening the ‘rule of law’
Some PRSPs and I-PRSPs emphasize that the poor themselves highlight the need for
improvement in this area. Others talk of reform only in the context of improving the
operating environment for the private sector.
3.2 What policies are not in the strategies?
3.2.1 Land reform
In most of the countries of the global south, real poverty reduction has to
be linked to land reform that benefits poor people (Alizaga 2000).
Redistribution of land from large to small farms ‘is undoubtedly one of
the most important weapons against poverty’ (Lipton 1998).
There are only a handful of references to land ownership in the PRSPs and I-PRSPs, and
mostly these relate to clarifying ownership rights or legislation; none talk seriously of
redistribution.
The Kenyan PRSP NGO working group (March 2000) notes:
With a few notable exemptions, namely the offer of land for squatters,
the section on land qualifies as the weakest and most disappointing
section in the entire paper. It hardly makes reference to the critical role
access to land and use of land has in making or reducing poverty despite
the ample evidence provided … Indeed, broader land reform must be at
the very centre of any concerted poverty reduction strategy because land
tenure is the most critical cause of structural inequity in Kenya.
Cambodian NGOs doubt that progressive recommendations on land reform will be
carried through:
On the content of the I-PRSP, certain provisions are commendable, as in
the intent to embark on land reform ... However, some NGOs remain
sceptical about the political will of the government to actually implement
many of the progressive provisions … (NGO Forum on Cambodia 2001).
3.2.2 Labour laws
Few of the strategies discuss policies on labour laws, a minimum wage, safety or
employment standards, beyond talking about the state’s role in regulation.18
3.2.3 Vulnerable groups
No strategies mention children’s rights. Other disadvantaged and vulnerable groups
receive little attention: there is only one mention of orphans, people with disabilities,
and refugees (Kenya), only three mentions of street children (Cambodia, Kenya and
Zambia) and no mentions of widows or people with learning disabilities (although
Nicaragua mentions the people with disabilities in its poverty diagnosis).
3.2.4 The NGO Forum on Cambodia (2001) reports:
… although problems such as violence against women and trafficking are
recognized in the I-PRSP, it does not provide concrete solutions in terms
of legislation or relevant policy measures to address these problems. The
same may be said of plight of children and their rights. For instance, the
I-PRSP identifies street children as among the most vulnerable groups in
Cambodia, and yet, adequate resources have not been allocated to
address their plight. Furthermore, the I-PRSP is largely silent on the
issue of children’s rights. There are no policy directives on a compulsory
national birth registration, adoption, or a national juvenile justice system.
The PRSPs and I-PRSPs contain scant reference to citizens’ rights guaranteed in any
international agreements (e.g. Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Labour
Organization Conventions). There is no mention of the 20:20 target8 for social sector
spending.
3.2.5 Gender
Poverty eradication without gender equality is impossible and a
contradiction in terms (UNDP 1997: 110 cited in Gerster 2000: 10).
Gender is mentioned in most of the PRSPs and I-PRSPs, and the analysis in the Kenyan
and Ethiopian strategies seems good. But in general, there are very few proposals to
address the poverty consequences of gender inequalities directly, although a few
strategies talk of assistance for girl students with school fees, access for mothers to
health services or access for women to micro-credit.
Much Southern civil society comment has focussed on the lack of voice for women’s
organizations in the drawing up of PRSPs. Extracts in Table 9 give a taste of the policy
concerns being expressed on gender.
CSOs are concerned that weak gender analysis, has resulted in an absence of concrete
legislative or policy solutions to assist women, either pro-actively or in overcoming
existing biases.
It has been argued that SAPs in the 1980s both worsened gender relations and were
hampered by them. They were both inequitable in terms of gender and inefficient in
terms of economics.
8 The 20:20 formula supported by the World Bank calls upon developing and developed countries to
allocate 20 per cent of overseas development assistance and 20 per cent of national budgets to basic
social services: health, nutrition, education, water and sanitation.19
Research shows that reducing gender inequalities can improve both
agricultural yields and women’s incentives to produce tradable goods. It
can reduce discrimination in employment and lead not just to an increase
in female income, but also in national income. It shows that investments
in female education can have major benefits in terms of reducing child
mortality, reducing fertility, increasing production and increasing
women’s voice in local and national affairs. However, in the 14 PRSPs
completed, gender as a cross-cutting issue has been addressed in variable
ways, and generally in a weak manner (Burdon 2000).
3.2.6 Mitigating risks of exposure to the global arena
Although the macroeconomic arena is seen as the key to growth and development, the
IMF itself recognizes that volatility is increasing.9 A favourable external economic
environment is crucial to the achievements of many of the policies outlined in the
PRSPs and I-PRSPs, yet it receives very little analysis.
In a number of cases, in the poverty diagnoses of the PRSPs and I-PRSPs, there are
mentions of the vulnerability of the country’s economy due to increased openness to the
global economy.
For example, Bolivia’s I-PRSP states:
Growth would have been even higher if Bolivia had not had to face
various natural disasters and a significant deterioration in its terms of
trade, estimated at 38 per cent for the decade… the domestic economy
continues to be highly vulnerable to international economic shocks
because of the high degree of dependence on raw material exports from
the primary sector.
Malawi’s I-PRSP states:
… 85 per cent of Malawi’s population derive their livelihood from
agriculture. The sector accounts for over 30 per cent of GDP and close to
70 per cent of export earnings. The sector is therefore key to sustained
economic growth and poverty alleviation. Due to the dependence on
agriculture, the economy remains fragile and vulnerable to external
shocks.
But neither Malawi’s nor Bolivia’s I-PRSP contains concrete plans to address any
unexpected reduction in the financial resources available for poverty reduction. In fact,
only one country (Mauritania) has a separate risk assessment section for its poverty
reduction strategy.
Guyana’s I-PRSP has the most explicit reference to the external context for exports. In
its poverty diagnosis, it notes that the economy suffered setbacks in 1997–98, due to
‘deteriorating commodity prices in international markets’ and then later recognizes,
‘… that growing global trade liberalization is expected to reduce such access (to
9 ‘... the increased uncertainty of macroeconomic relationships in a world of volatile global capital
markets ... made it more difficult to specify macroeconomic performance criteria for more than a
brief period ahead… ’ (IMF 2001a).20
preferential markets) over time, and to require Guyana to compete increasingly at world
prices’.
Guyana proposes to address this problem through continued reliance on the private
sector for management, production and capital, along with new investment in plant and
equipment. However, Guyana’s private sector is described as only ‘embryonic’.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) increasingly sets the context for all countries’
trade policy measures. Implementing WTO agreements is increasingly costly.10 Yet,
only Uganda’s PRSP mentions the WTO.11 None of the PRSPs or I-PRSPs mentions
action to negotiate a more favourable external environment for trade.
Several NGO commentaries highlight not only the opportunities, but also the risks to
poor people of economic integration into world markets.
The discussions were nested in domestic policy and rarely looked at the
harmful edge of globalization. International trade issues such as food
dumping, collapse of protective tariffs and subsidies and lastly,
intellectual property rights were absent or mute from the participants
recommendations ... The NGO Memorandum urged [Kenyan]
government action in this area ... (Hougton 2000).
3.2.7 Export competition
Many of the PRSPs and I-PRSPs talk of promoting growth in high-potential areas.
Table 10 shows the large number of countries pining their hopes for growth on exactly
the same sectors: tourism (nine countries), mining (eight) and cotton (six).
Cotton and minerals are already highly susceptible to large fluctuations in world market
prices. This overlap of focus on the same exports will increase downward pressure on
world prices of these commodities. Yet none of the PRSPs or I-PRSPs include a
detailed forecast of external market opportunities.
3.2.8 Contingency plans
There is no discussion of what spending would be curtailed or what contingency plans
would be put into operation if a natural disaster or political upheaval caused a
humanitarian crisis.
While these potential sources of instability are diagnosed,12 there are only a few
mentions of disaster preparedness strategies and earlywarning systems for drought or
10 The World Bank has estimated that the average cost to each developing country of implementing just
three of the trade agreements demanded by the WTO is about $150 million.
11 Noting their government’s emphasis on the need for economic openness, the Ugandan Debt Network
urged the Ugandan government to place emphasis on finding markets for increased productivity.
‘Pressure should be brought to bear by all partners on WTO, the EU, USA and other big markets to
open them to our products. Increased productivity without markets will not eradicate poverty’
(Ugandan Debt Network 2000).
12 The Central African Republic I-PRSP mentions external insecurity from conflict and the Guyanan
I-PRSP mentions El Niño adversely affecting agricultural output.21
other natural disasters.13 Food storage and reserve policies, and flood defence works,
are areas where discussion of plans could legitimately have been expected.
3.2.9 Political context
The internal political situation of a country is not considered an influential variable in
standard economic analysis and is rarely discussed in the PRSPs and I-PRSPs. This is
unhelpful, as in reality, political changes certainly affect both the economy (e.g. through
investor confidence) and the capacity for policy implementation. Indeed the Guyanan
I-PRSP specifically states that their economy suffered setbacks due to the ‘political
uncertainties leading to the December 1997 elections and developments thereafter’.
Perhaps this points to the need for better ownership of strategies by people outside
government, clearer prioritization of policies and spending, and greater transparency.
3.2.10 Realism and capacity for change
CSOs are critical of the way most PRSPs and I-PRSPs fail to give a clear sense of
prioritization within the context of the resources assumed to be available. There is little
discussion about the sequencing of reforms, despite the fact that this can have a crucial
influence on their results.14
Most PRSPs talk sensibly about the importance of implementing poverty reduction
strategies over the long term. It takes time to put privatization into practice, attract
private investment and FDI, mobilize domestic savings, implement governmental
decentralization and improve infrastructure such as rural roads. However, PRGF loans
are for three years and many of the targets in the PRSPs and I-PRSPs seem to be based
on a three-year time scale. As such, a large number of poverty reduction strategies seem
unrealistically ambitious, particularly those relating to institutional or behavioural
changes.
Many PRSPs and I-PRSPs note constraints of human capacity, but are unclear about
how this will effect implementation.
If targets are missed, a problem of managing expectations may emerge.
3.3 IMF and World Bank policy advice: repeating the mistakes of SAPs?
The PRS approach does not appear to have been successful in aligning
macroeconomic issues and poverty issues more closely than in the past.
The two areas are still divorced, and macroeconomic frameworks do not
appear to have changed significantly as a result of PRSPs. One of the
main reasons for this seems to be that the country governments and IFI
staff concerned seem unable to integrate the two policies and see the
changes needed in terms of the process (the preparation and
implementation of policy) rather than the content (Eurodad 2000).
13 Kenya, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and Uganda.
14 ‘The PRSP can be an incredibly valuable tool if it can make explicit the risks and trade-offs of
adopting one policy over another, what sequence is best, a fast reform over a slow one, or a particular
combination of policies’ (Kessler 2000).22
In all the PRSPs and I-PRSPs surveyed, there is a remarkable similarity of policies on
macroeconomics, social spending and governance. Generally these policies are similar
to those promoted previously in SAPs. What is new, however, is the increased extension
of liberalization and privatization policies to service sectors (although this should be
seen in the context of most other sectors already having been privatized under SAPs).
These similarities raise the following concerns for CSOs and NGOs. The PRSPs and
I-PRSPs:
- rely on the same ‘trickle-down’ model as the SAPs, which failed to reduce
poverty in the past;
- do not recognize the costs of growth (e.g. reduction in social capital);
- do not follow the causal analysis of poverty through to inform macroeconomic
policy choices;
- do not look at the consequences of policies in poverty terms; and
- have targets that have been overly influenced by the IFIs and insufficiently
influenced by the results of public participation.
In summary, CSOs and NGOs fear that the PRSPs and I-PRSPs do not have poverty
reduction at their heart. This analysis is echoed in the 2001 report to the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights by the independent
expert on the effects of SAPs and foreign debt on the full enjoyment of all human rights,
particularly economic, social and cultural rights (Cheru 2001).
After studying the experiences of Benin, Chad, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal,
Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda, the report concluded:
- all nine papers reviewed emphasize the importance of growth for poverty reduction,
but they all fail to demonstrate the links between the two;
- the need to increase social spending is heavily emphasized, but how the
macroeconomic aspects relate to poverty reduction goals is not clearly explained; and
- the broad macroeconomic objectives of the majority of the countries studied are
inconsistent with the poverty reduction goals.
Why have the poverty diagnoses in PRSPs and I-PRSPs not translated into
macroeconomic policy choices different from those in the failed SAPs of the past? Part
of the reason may be because the IMF continues to advise countries on macroeconomic
direction, while the World Bank advises on the design and impact of poverty reduction
strategies (IMF 2001c and Wood 2000).
The disconnection of advice between the IMF and the World Bank, and governments’
desire to please them in order to access loans, may help to explain many of the policy
choices made in PRSPs and I-PRSPs.23
4 Conclusion and recommendations
4.1 Conclusion
PRSPs and I-PRSPs are falling short of the goals publicly set out for them by the IMF
and World Bank. Public participation in the drawing up of PRSPs and I-PRSPs has been
less than had been hoped for, although the new space for dialogue between governments
and CSOs is welcome. The extent of country ownership of PRSPs and I-PRSPs is
questionable, with the IMF and World Bank appearing to retain a strong influence over
the final document. In the area of macroeconomic policy, there is a consistent adherence
to neoliberal market based tenets, and an emphasis on extensive privatization and
liberalization. Despite commitments to increased social sector spending, a continued
reliance on charges in some countries, risks compromising poor peoples’ access to basic
services.
Factors critical to the success of PRSPs and I-PRSPs are weak or absent:
- policy measures such as land reform and improved labour rights are needed to
ensure the poor benefit from economic growth;
- ‘external’ factors such as commodity prices and the political context need to be
taken into account; and
- procedures to ensure strategies are achievable need to be developed.
This analysis clearly shows the similarity of PRSPs and I-PRSPs to the SAPs, which
failed to reduced poverty in the past. The IMF and World Bank have not critically
assessed either the past impacts of SAPs or the future impacts of PRSPs.
Most PRSPs and I-PRSPs lack:
- a sustained and clear focus on poverty reduction;
- clear explanation of the connections between policies and their consequences for
the poor; and
- realism in what they hope to achieve.
On the evidence reviewed here, it is feared that PRSPs will not advance the fight against
poverty. Nevertheless, PRSPs and I-PRSPs now govern the lives of the majority of the
world’s poor people.
4.2 Recommendations
I. The IMF and World Bank should assess, and justify, the predicted impact on
poverty reduction of the policies, and reforms, they propose are included in
PRSPs.
II. The IMF and World Bank should support countries in monitoring and assessing
the poverty impact of their PRSP.
III. The governments on the boards of the IMF and World Bank should instigate an
independent assessment of the IFIs’ role in PRSPs, looking at: government
ownership, public participation, policy content and success in reducing poverty.24
Table 1
Participation
Country Civil society comments
Bolivia
In Bolivia, the church and CSOs organized a successful Foro Nacional, partly out of frustration with
the official Dialogo Nacional. This is a good example of a ‘bottom-up‘ approach to participation,
which governments and IFIs must respond to (Eurodad 2000).
After the opening of the comprehensive CSO-led Foro Nacional, the IMF representative ‘stated that
while the Forum’s conclusions might, rightly, influence the National Dialogue, they would need to be
limited to shaping the allocation of funds freed under HIPC II. Thus, macroeconomic targets were not
open to change’. He used as an example the fiscal deficit target ... The Bolivian dynamic was
summed up by Intermon: ‘The government and the IMF in Bolivia are closed, especially the latter as
to the macroeconomic policies being discussed in the framework and through the lens of the poverty
reduction objectives included in the PRSP. The discussion is open to focus on the funds released by
HIPC II but the macroeconomic framework, included now in the ESAF/PRGF programme, is not
open to public debate and scrutiny, nor to an iterative discussion that gives it consistency with the
poverty reduction statements made in general IMF/WB documents and repeated a number of times
by IMF officials’ (Eurodad 2000).
In Bolivia, for instance, the IMF has refused to discuss the macroeconomic programme with civil
society. Here speed has been a problem, denying poorer groups proper involvement in the process.
One of the outcomes of such shallow engagement is that the process ends up developing ‘wish-lists’
of issues, rather than the development of appropriate policies to address poverty. At the same time
the agenda has been dominated by HIPC, discussions over use of HIPC resource, and by the notion
of the use of a 'social fund' to address poverty, rather than coherently reviewing policies for poverty
reduction, growth and equity (Oxfam International 2000).
Finally, the I--PRSP indicates that the first dialogue was highly participatory and that the
organizations approved by consensus the four pillars of the government plan. This was not evident
and even the pertinent documents were not distributed sufficiently beforehand. Because of this one
can conclude that the first dialogue suffered from a lack of broad participation and there was no
follow-up done afterwards (translated from Spanish; Jubilee 2000 Bolivia 2000).
Consultations with NGOs in Bolivia have been last minute and have not been open to all interested
NGOs. Only one NGO outside La Paz was invited to the initial consultations, and one of the most
prominent NGO networks in La Paz was not included. Moreover, NGOs have not been given official
access to information and documentation on which to base their inputs. Where documents have
been made available they have been written in English and received too late to allow effective
consultation amongst members (Bretton Woods Project 2000).
Burkina Faso
According to the official documentation, the PRSP was drawn up within a participatory framework.
However, NGO representatives have informed us that they are unable to ascertain which CSOs
were involved in the process—and the director of the main national NGO coordination body
remained unaware of the PRSP concept even after it had been submitted (Eurodad 2000).
Cambodia
The PRSP process in Cambodia thus far has yet to be described as truly participatory in nature or
country-owned which are two necessary requirements by the World Bank and IMF in the preparation
of the PRSP. This initial assessment is based on three criteria (a) Participation of relevant
stakeholders in all stages of decision-making, including the initial phases; (b) Timely circulation of
relevant documents in the Khmer language; (c) NGO/civil society representation in relevant decision-




Country Civil society comments
Cambodia (con’t)
(a) There has been no real attempt to incorporate the ideas of NGOs/CSOs in the initial setting of
the priorities of the I-PRSP. The World Bank Country Office Chief made it clear to NGO Forum
representatives in May 2000 that NGO/CSO input was not expected or planned until after the
completion of the I-PRSP and the beginning of the full PRSP process.
The SEDPII process, as with the I-PRSP, has yet to fully engage civil society on the substance of
its poverty reduction strategy. Phase I in May-July, in which the SEDPII concept paper and
macroeconomic framework were prepared, did not include any civil society representation ….
(b) All draft versions of the I-PRSP have been in English ... While not doubting the efforts of a number
of English-speaking government officials, important government decision-makers and broad
sections of civil society are excluded by this process.
The Khmer version was still not available to NGOs/CSOs by the time that the 8th and final draft was
submitted to the Cabinet in October 2000. The NGO Forum’s National NGO/CSO workshop on the
RGC’s poverty reduction strategy on 24-25 October was held without the benefit of the Khmer
version.
(c) The I-PRSP claims that CSOs actively participated in the launching of the I-PRSP on 25 July 2000.
The NGO Forum, which is one of the largest umbrella NGO networks in Cambodia, however, is
unaware of such ‘launching’. Instead, foreign representatives of the NGO Forum and CCC were
invited to a brief government-donor consultation in early August, but there was still no attempt to
involve Cambodian civil society at this meeting. It is unknown to what extent that the Cabinet will be
willing to incorporate the suggestions of NGOs/CSOs resulting from NGO consultations organized
by the NGO Forum on the draft I-PRSP in September-October ... (NGO Forum on Cambodia
2001).
Insufficient time and a failure to write documents in the national language limited the opportunity for
NGO involvement in Cambodia's poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) process, according to the
NGO Forum on Cambodia, which includes local and international NGOs. Russell Peterson of the NGO
Forum, November 2000, commented that ‘there has been insufficient contact between government and
NGOs to date’. All drafts of the Interim PRSP (I-PRSP) up to the eighth and final draft were written in
English. ‘This raises serious questions about country ownership of the I-PRSP. The choice of language
can exclude important government decision-makers, limit civil society participation, impose foreign
ways of thinking, and give foreign donors an inordinate amount of power to influence the final outcome’,
said Peterson. ‘We found that Cambodians only began to be fully included in the discussions and
debates of the NGO Forum when Khmer was made the main language of discourse. A truly country-
owned PRSP process would entail drafting the document solely in Khmer, discussions between
government and civil society solely in Khmer, and with the donors (not the Cambodians) puzzling over
the meaning of the translation and the strange concepts used’ (Bretton Woods Update 2001).
Cameroon
The consultation process: this is strongly influenced by the World Bank and ought to be questioned, as
it does not incorporate anything that will allow civil society organizations more influence over the fight
against poverty. The Catholic church has also expressed concern that the churches and other CSOs
have not been involved in the establishment of the PRSP. However, the churches have organized their




Country Civil society comments
Ghana
A recent DFID-funded study of the PRSP process in Ghana and Zambia also reveals problems with
PRSP consultation (Godfrey 2000). In Ghana, ... civil society representatives ... feel that the Bank is
only prepared to accept participation within its own narrow policy parameters, ruling out challenges
to neoliberal economic orthodoxy. Also, rather than a single process involving the Bank, the
government and civil society, in practice there are two bipartite processes going on, one involving
the Bank and civil society and the other the Bank and the Ghanaian government. Consequently, one
of the conclusions of this study is that civil society should give first priority to strengthening its
dialogue with government, rather than with the Bank. Specifically, Ghana’s civil society organizations
have expressed these criticisms of the way their government has handled previous civil society
consultations on macroeconomic policy: lack of commitment to participation; little access to
information either on the process itself or the economic analysis on which government policies are
based; not enough time for meaningful consultation; poor coordination of the civil society contribution
(Terry 2001).
One comment from a Ghanaian NGO representative strikes an ominous note for women’s
organizations; ‘the impact of dialogue … is much greater if the civil society structures speak with a
single voice’ (Godfrey ibid.). While this may be true, it is not clear where it would leave women’s
organizations, which may be marginalized even within civil society. Male-dominated NGOs, trade
unions or professional associations are unlikely to prioritize the gender interests of poor women.
Instead, it is likely that ‘speaking with a single voice’ would mean subordinating women’s gender
interests to men’s. In contrast, civil society representatives from other parts of the world have criticized
the Bank’s naivety in expecting civil society to present a common agenda. They argue that the Bank
needs to accept that civil society encompasses many different interests (Christian Aid 2000, quoted in
Terry 2001).
Honduras
Civil society in Honduras describes the process as an ‘illusion of participation’. Civil society
organizations have been involved in discussions, but frequently meetings are short, mainly focused
on presenting government’s view, with little time for proper engagement (Oxfam International 2000).
In Honduras … the government has created a ‘civil society participation commission’, and offered
meetings with NGOs to discuss poverty issues. Civil society groups in Honduras admit that there
have been improvements in dialogue, but participation is described so far as being superficial: for
example, its preliminary diagnosis of poverty in the country was only presented to NGOs after it had
been first discussed with an IMF/WB delegation. Similarly, the government did not show CSOs the
final I-PRSP before it was given to the Bank (Eurodad 2000).
When the Honduran government announced that the schedule for production of the Interim PRSP
would be moved up by two months, Honduran civil society groups felt the need to produce a parallel
PRSP, as it appeared to them that there was little real political will to include them in the process
(Siddharth 2000).
Kenya
... the discussions about social priorities were kept separate from discussions about fiscal restraint.
Consulting with civil society groups about poverty reduction while denying them even basic




Country Civil society comments
Kenya (con’t)
The interim PRSP developed by government has been seen by some civil society organizations as a
positive change in government ways of working. There were a number of consultations with a wide
range of stakeholders. Drafts were widely circulated for comment, with sufficient time allowed for civil
society groups to undertake analysis and to provide feedback. A national forum was held, and the
revised draft circulated for comment before finalizing, with comments from civil society included in
the final document. Now the government is embarking on a wider process for the development of the
PRSP, with regional and grassroots consultations planned (Oxfam International 2000).
Kenya’s Collaborative Centre for Gender and Development found that it was vital to maintain a
distinct ‘women’s agenda’ during the I-PRSP consultation process, in order to prevent it being lost.
This strategy paid off very well in that, during consultation events, ‘the women’s voice …was clearer
than those of any other group’ (Shiverenje 2000: 19, quoted in Terry 2001). The centre’s experience
of trying to influence the I-PRSP has resulted in several important achievements, such as the
inclusion of gender equity issues in the I-PRSP and substantial budget allocations to gender
mainstreaming measures and programmes addressing women’s gender interests
Malawi
Working groups were hastily put together, and there was minimal consultation with civil society as to
who should be on the working groups. As a result many of the groups at first met without any CSO
representation. As meetings have continued, more CSO groups have become involved, but a
number have still to attend or be invited (Malawi Economic Justice Network 2001).
Nicaragua
The process has been fraught, with government unwilling to allow proper civil society participation in
the development of the interim PRSP. Some consultations have taken place, with government listing
any contact with civil society as ‘participation’. But it appears the views of civil society organizations
have been ignored. CONPES (the National Council of Economic and Social Planning—made up of
civil society, private sector groups and political parties) made 56 recommendations in April, but do
not know, as yet, whether these recommendations have been incorporated in the interim PRSP. The
latest draft of the Interim PRSP has been developed in Washington, in English, further marginalizing
Spanish-speaking people from discussion of development in Nicaragua (Oxfam International 2000).
In Nicaragua, for example, the government has handpicked, in the CONPES, the organizations and
individuals that it wants to take part in the PRS process. Transparency is a major problem—the
government has sent the latest I-PRSP draft to the IFIs, including the IDB, but CONPES
representatives have still not seen it. As one commentator put it, ‘it does not make sense to talk
about participation when those who are supposed to participate are not even informed about the
content of the document in question’. In the Nicaraguan case, it seems that the government is much
keener to hear from the IFIs than from the domestic stakeholders (Eurodad 2000).
Tanzania
The perspective of Tanzanian NGOs, following presentations from the government, the World Bank
and the IMF regarding the PRSP was that Tanzanian CSO involvement in the preparation of the
PRSP will be consultative but not participatory. One of the deficiencies of a consultative approach is
that it does not give those being consulted fair time and adequate resources and space for
presenting their views. And, too often issues and concerns voiced during the consultation have little





Country Civil society comments
Tanzania (con’t)
Throughout the PRSP processes, civil society organizations were demanding for more active
involvement and participation in the process of both NGOs and communities. However, on the whole
CSOs were involved in a superficial and half-handed manner. The government developed the
document internally, while civil society organizations were involved in a separate process, convened
by the Tanzania Coalition for Debt and Development (TCDD). At a later stage, the civil society
working groups managed to participate in the sharing sessions in the documents already prepared
by the government (the zonal workshops). Rather than having a joint-sharing process about the best
way to merge the civil society and government inputs, the inputs prepared by the civil society
organizations were simply sent to the government-led processes for integration. The consultation
that was done was all in a rushed manner, not allowing for true dialogue, discussion, and debate.
The latest stage, the national workshop carried after the zonal workshops of the government
process, involved NGOs to some extent, in that some NGOs were invited to comment at that
workshop on all the topics in the strategy paper. Some of their inputs were very critical but ended
there. They were not again called for their participation in the final drafting of the paper, although
they had argued that the final process should include representatives of civil society organizations. In
this way, civil society organizations were involved only at late stages of the process and did not truly
participate in the process of preparing the poverty strategy paper for the United Republic of Tanzania
(Tanzania Gender Networking Project).
Uganda
The process of agreeing the PRSP has been a very strong one, building on a track record of
participatory approaches, and with civil society organizations generally positive about the
outcome. A number of civil society recommendations have been incorporated into the PRSP,
including a strong emphasis on governance, greater discussion of peace-building as an option for
resolving conflict, and disaster preparedness and mitigation. Other additions include increased
funding of adult literacy, elimination of tax on bicycles, and exemption of agricultural inputs from
VAT. However, there are concerns that the civil society consultation is not yet formalized in a legal
framework, or fully institutionalized, and that it relies on the good will of government officials, and
as such can easily be withdrawn (Oxfam International 2000).
Zambia
Zambian CSOs . ... feel the government has ignored their contributions to previous consultations.
Zambian CSOs have identified the cost of information provision as a particular stumbling block to
wider public participation (Godfrey DFID) (Terry 2001)
In Zambia, a country that has not had extensive consultative process in the past, the PRSP
process is seen to be introducing a new type of dialogue (Eurodad 2000).29
Table 2
Ownership
Country Comments by civil society
Bolivia
In practice, however, country ownership (which is broader than ‘government’ ownership yet
largely undefined, for example, how are competing interests resolved?) remains elusive. To take
the example of Bolivia:
- NGOs do not regard the process in Bolivia as a model process and do not regard the national
plan as a ‘country-owned’ plan.
- The government is not leading the process of consulting with development partners. The
Bank has taken the lead in consulting with NGOs in the areas in which it works. On the fourth
pillar of the plan, in which the Bank is not involved, the government has had limited
consultation with NGOs. This not only draws into question the Bank's view of ownership it
questions its commitment to a comprehensive strategy.
- The mid-term consultative group meeting which was held in June 1999 was held in Paris, not
the capital, La Paz. The official explanation for this was that higher-ranking civil servants from
donor countries would be more likely to attend a Paris meeting than a La Paz meeting. To
ensure Bolivia got the maximum money available, it was preferable to hold the meeting in
Europe. However, this meant that civil society could not participate in the meetings; limiting
transparency and openness. It also brings into question donors’ commitment to encouraging
broad-based ownership (Bretton Woods Project 2000).
Cambodia
On the role of the WB, IMF, ADB and the international community, it is important to note that the
PRSP process at this stage is still largely donor-driven, with foreign technical consultants of major
donor institutions like the WB-IMF and the ADB setting the parameters of Cambodia’s poverty
reduction strategy. It is not known to what extent the WB and IMF will accept specific
recommendations from NGOs/CSOs or the government which differ from these institutions’
current policy (NGO Forum on Cambodia 2001)
Honduras
The Fund’s timetable for PRGF has reportedly interfered with the PRSP process. The Fund
wanted the I-PRSP for April 2000 rather than for June 2000 as planned, so as to fit in with the
Fund’s mid-term review.
More significantly, the Honduras case has shown that the IFIs are coming dangerously close to
undermining due democratic processes. One of the reforms being pushed by the IFIs is the
privatization of the electricity industry. This was one of the key reforms required in Honduras’
PRGF programme, but the democratic processes in the country required that the legislation be
approved by the National Congress. This, however, did not happen: the proposed reform was the
cause of much controversy in the country, and NGO groups made it clear to a Bank/Fund mission
that there was no national consensus on the issue, hence the lack of agreement in the National
Assembly. In the event, the Fund granted a waiver and the PRGF was approved. But that was not
the end of the issue. Subsequent IFI missions have apparently pressured the Honduran
government and CSOs on the issue. The conditionality remains in Honduras’ PRGF; moreover
the decision point document released since notes that privatization will be finalized before
completion point is reached. It thus appears that although the National Congress does not want to
privatize electricity, the country will not achieve completion point until it does, thus potentially
blocking access to considerable new resources. It is easy to see how economic exigencies may
persuade Honduras to eventually privatize, it will be at the price of undermining democratic
processes. As one commentator put it, ‘by being rigid on assumptions of what is the best way to
manage the economy—including what to do with state companies—the Fund and the Bank are
actually the ones that are blocking … the feeling of ownership’ (Eurodad 2000).
(Table continues)30
Table 2: Ownership (con’t)
Country Comments by civil society
Kenya
The perception of the PRSP as a product primarily for the World Bank and the IMF ‘something we
must do to resume ESAF/PRGF’ reduces the scope for seriously considering Kenyan civic and
private interests. It also undermines the importance of national sovereignty in the process
(Grusky 2000; Globalization Challenge Initiative et al. 2000).
Nicaragua
In Nicaragua, the IFIs role has been less than optimal, though this has not been at all helped by
the government’s attitude to participation. The NGO network represented in the ‘CONPES’
stakeholders’ council reports that the IMF mission chief giving macroeconomic inputs to the draft
I-PRSP did not even answer a request to meet with NGOs that wanted to discuss the PRS’
contents. Worse still was the role of the World Bank. After CONPES advised that there was no
coherence between the goals and the planned programmes and projects in the government’s I-
PRSP draft, a World Bank team arrived and worked intensively to ‘harmonize’ the different
aspects. This resulted in a new draft, which was then sent straight to Washington. Thus the status
of the latest draft of Nicaragua’s I-PRSP is: it was written by a World Bank team; it is written in
English; at the time of writing, it is still not published, despite being finished in July; the CONPES
national stakeholders’ council has not been consulted on it, despite it having been already sent to
Washington (Eurodad 2000).
Tanzania
In Tanzania, for example, the government had developed a Tanzania assistance strategy (TAS),
which in conjunction with the national poverty eradication strategy (NPES) could very sensibly
have formed the foundation for a PRS. The NPES had been prepared in a broad-based and
participatory way, including scrutiny from parliament. The TAS process consisted of a technical
sub-committee convened by the Ministry of Finance, which co-ordinated six task groups with
broad participation. However, the World Bank was keen for a new and separate process to be
developed.
‘…because of the urgency with which they wanted to secure HIPC relief; the Tanzanians initially
acquiesced in the World Bank writing the I-PRSP for them. The TAS will survive as an instrument
for managing donor involvement in implementing the PRSP’.
Moreover, the fact that the PRSP had separate consultation processes from the TAS means that
the PRSP has actually undermined the pre-existing country processes and duplicated efforts.
Donors have noted that this has imposed a burden on government, undermining ownership, and
delaying some activities, such as the public expenditure review (PER).
In Tanzania, the Bank is seen as being too intrusive in the country’s process—to the point that even
the IMF have complained. Local Bank staff are apparently considered to be very knowledgeable
about the Tanzanian context, but the perception is that they think they know best. More worryingly,
after the Tanzanian cabinet approved the I-PRSP, they asked the World Bank resident
representative to take it away and edit it, because ‘it didn’t flow’. So although there may not be
‘PRSP blueprints in drawers in Washington’ there appear to be final PRSP edits being done on WB
desks in Dar es Salaam, which is hardly the best example of country ownership (Eurodad 2000).
The secret negotiations dealt with key macroeconomic and structural issues. These negotiations
excluded citizen's groups. Citizens that buy and sell and pay taxes were excluded from discussions
about key decisions about whether or how the economy of Tanzania will be liberalized, privatized
and increasingly oriented to produce exports. Policies, such as those relating to the price of money
and goods, taxation options, trade liberalization, and the privatization of key state-owned enterprises
were not ‘on the table’ for negotiation. Beyond public view, a handful of government officials




Country Comments by civil society
Tanzania (con’t)
Donor-engineered processes, such as the CAS and the PRSP, threaten to relegate civil society
to marginal roles in their own countries. The World Bank’s new CAS for Tanzania includes a
table which rates the relative level of involvement of the Tanzanian government, civil society,
and external actors in 13 different areas, or sectors. It is astounding that this chart shows a high
involvement and focus by the GOT in only two areas (the financial sector and decentralization).
Tanzanian civil society is also perceived to have a high involvement and focus in only two areas
(rural agriculture and education). The World Bank portrays itself as highly involved in five areas
(poverty alleviation and growth; private sector development; infrastructure; education; and
public sector reform). The bilateral donors are portrayed as highly focused in six areas (poverty
alleviation and growth; environment; health/water; education; anti-corruption and
decentralization). External actors, who have no accountability to Tanzanian citizens, are micro-
managing the government of Tanzania.
The IMF and World Bank transactions are accompanied by excessive levels of conditionality …
levels that are incompatible with the IMF’s stated goal of building ‘country ownership’ for the
reform process. For instance, there are approximately 157 policies listed in the ‘Tanzania:
Policy Matrix, 2000-2002,’ attached to the interim poverty reduction strategy paper
(PRSP) ... The policy prescriptions attached to IMF and WB programmes pressure the GOT to
carry out political, economic and social reforms designated by the IMF and World Bank and
acceded to by the GOT. Such excessive conditionality amounts to micromanagement of the
GOT by its creditors (Globalization Challenge Initiative et al. 2000).
Uganda
That even Uganda, whose PEAP was perhaps the most sophisticated and robust poverty
reduction strategy amongst low-income countries, felt obliged to come up with a separate
‘PRSP’ paper, rather than simply present the PEAP is perhaps the best example of the
excessively normative aspects of the PRS process to date (Eurodad 2000).32
Table 3
Macroeconomic policy
Country Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs
Benin
… environment of financial stability and strong and sustainable growth ... strict budgetary
policy; a prudent monetary policy ... ; and an acceleration of the structural and sectoral
reforms …
Bolivia
… preserve macroeconomic stability which, in turn, require continuity in implementation of
prudent fiscal policies ... restricting fiscal expenditures ... maintaining price stability, and the
exchange rate regime will also continue to be flexible to promote competitiveness in the
external sector ... reduction of state participation in the economy ...
Burkina Faso
Accelerate equity-based growth ... acceleration of growth is a pre-requisite for reducing
poverty. The government will therefore implement major structural reforms in order to open up
the economy to the outside, lower production costs while improving factor productivity,
encourage initiative and support activities to generate income and create jobs, particularly in
rural areas. Maintaining a prudent budgetary policy and targeting the development of
economic infrastructure and basic social services, coupled with implementation of more
incentive-oriented tax policy …
Central African Republic
… the pursuit of stronger and sustainable growth ... improving the performance of revenue
collection agencies and strengthening expenditure control ... keeping inflation under control
and enforcing prudent regulation of the banking system ... speed up privatization of the large
public enterprises ...
Chad
… a high level of sustained economic growth ... stimulate investment ... development of the
private sector ...
Ethiopia
… development of agriculture is viewed as an important vehicle for
industrialization ... maintaining macroeconomic stability ... public expenditure management will
be strengthened ...
… taken from the Letter of Intent 29.1.01 ‘promoting sustainable growth, through the
implementation of further structural reforms in a context of macroeconomic stability’.
Guyana
… accelerated economic growth ... maintain a viable macroeconomic framework by
implementing prudent fiscal and monetary policies … advance the course of private sector
development ... maintaining a sound macroeconomic, trade and investment framework ...
Kenya
… sustained and rapid economic growth ... economic growth that considerably outpaces
population growth ... enabling environment for the private sector ... acceleration and
broadening of the scope of structural reform ...
(Table continues)33
Table 3: Macroeconomic policy
(continued)
Country Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs
Madagascar
… generate growth rates still higher ... controlling inflation ... set the basis for even more
constant growth ... quickly advance the privatization programme ... controlling public
deficit ... careful management of the monetary policy in order to control inflation ...
Mali
… a framework of consistent macroeconomic and sectoral policies that ensure strong and
sustainable growth ... The need, while strengthening the macroeconomic and financial
framework, to pursue and consolidate the adjustment measures ...
Malawi
Maintain macroeconomic stability, reduce distortions, and increase competition. Broad-based
and sustainable growth will require macroeconomic stability, prudent fiscal and monetary
management and a focus on priority investments.
Mauritania
… accelerating economic growth ... package of macroeconomic stabilization, deepening of
structural reforms and investment programmes…
Nicaragua
… broad-based economic growth and structural reform ... private sector-driven market
economy ... agricultural expansion ...
Tanzania
Overall GDP growth of 6% ... . Maintain sound macroeconomic policies and intensify
implementation of reforms aimed at bolstering market efficiency, notably in agriculture and
raising factor productivity.
Uganda
Economic growth must be sustainable, high quality and broadly based ... macroeconomic
policy will be accompanied by a deepening of structural reforms in key areas including banking
and financial systems, public utilities and the transport infrastructure, which are aimed
removing key constraints to private sector growth ...
Zambia
… strong pro-poor economic growth ... Improve fiscal discipline for continued stable
macroeconomic environment…34
Table 4
Growth and inflation targets
Country Economic growth rate (GDP) % Rate of inflation %
Bolivia 5
Benin 5-6 maximum 3
Burkina Faso 7 3
Central African Republic 5 2







Uganda 7 maximum 5
Zambia 5 single digit35
Table 5
Liberalization and external competitiveness
Country Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs
Benin
… pursue economic liberalization by deregulating prices, withdrawing from productive
activities (in particular by privatizing public industrial and commercial enterprises) and
opening the various sectors of the economy to competition.
Bolivia
… liberalizing market access (for gas) …
Burkina Faso
Trade liberalization … gradual liberalization of the sector (cotton) by encouraging the entry
of new companies and greater competition. … the economy of BF must become much more
open to foreign trade and to foreign direct investment … firm resolve to open up the
economy and to pursue an ambitious export-oriented economic programme.
Central African Republic
Restructuring and liberalization of the productive sector and promotion of foreign direct
investment … Opening up of the country, both internally and to the outside
world … economic deregulation … deregulating the transport sector … eliminate existing
controls over prices or margins, including those relating to petroleum, electricity, water,
transportation and telecommunications, as the relevant companies are
privatized … fundamental reform of the cotton sector implying the government’s withdrawal,
discontinuation of the fixed price system, and opening of the sector to competition.
Chad
… liberalization of cotton sector …
Ethiopia
Agriculture has to be made internationally competitive, and part of its production has to be
oriented towards exports … remove and amend regulatory impediments, which hinder
private sector development ... Context of progressive integration into the global
economy … attain current account convertibility …
Guyana
Open and expand markets for exports …
Kenya
Assisting the private sector gain access to export markets and attract foreign
investment … rationalization of the trade regime … harmonize, rationalize and reduce tariff
structures within the region … let markets determine interest rates and the exchange
rate … Dismantling intrusive, restrictive and outmoded laws and regulations in all productive
sectors … reviewing the power market structure to define a vision for a more competitive
market … deregulation of the petroleum market … liberalized seeds policy… Remove in a
cross-sectoral manner, constraints to private sector development … substantially reducing
regulatory and licensing requirements … review options to liberalize, reform and/or privatize
other institutions in the financial sector … the liberalization programme of the Kenyan
economy … the rules governing foreign portfolio investments will be reviewed with a view to
making them more investor friendly … (Table continues)36
Table 5: Liberalization and external competitiveness
(continued)
Country Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs
Madagascar
The liberalization (of) the movement of capital … (pertaining to agriculture) an opening up of
the sector to important investors to ensure an easier integration to markets … integrative
management of the water resources and the liberalization of the sector …
Malawi
Reduce barriers to trade … maintain the lowered levels of tariffs … strengthen export
promotion activities …
Mauritania
State divestiture and liberalization of the banking and insurance sectors. Completing reforms
related to liberalization and privatization in the telecommunications, energy and air transport
sectors. Promote the openness of the country and its integration into the global economy.
Tanzania
Increased emphasis on reforms aimed at promoting export oriented expansion and
diversification of pro-poor sectors with a view to enabling the poor to share increasingly in the
benefits of globalization. Intensify reforms aimed a bolstering market efficiency …
Uganda
The second key element is setting appropriate macroeconomic incentives. This involves
economic openness, which encourages exports and labour-intensive investments.
Zambia
Stimulate non-mining exports, reduce/eliminate barriers to imports and continue to rationalize
tariff structure. Reduce maximum import tariff rate to 20%.37
Table 6
Privatization and courting of private sector
Country Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs
Benin
Expand the role of the private sector and stimulate private investment in diversifying
output ... withdrawing from productive activities (in particular by privatizing public industrial and
commercial enterprises). The process of privatizing public enterprises in the
telecommunications, energy and cotton sectors has already begun. ... In the textile industry,
public enterprises are expected to be privatized within the next two years. In the transport
sector, steps ... to place the railroad company under concession, to select a private company to
manage Cotonou Airport, and to involve the private sector in managing Cotonou Autonomous
Port ... cotton ... liberalizing the sector ... eliminating the monopsony of the public enterprise
(SONAPRA) on the primary marketing of seed cotton ... transfer the responsibility for organizing
input purchases to the private sector.
Bolivia
Promote participation of the private sector in areas previously assumed by the public
sector ... limit discretionality through the transfer of a number of responsibilities from the public
sector to the private sector.
Burkina Faso
A strategy that aims to make the private sector the engine of growth … the policy directed at
opening up the economy and freeing prices … privatization of existing state interests … the
government will continue to disengage itself from production and marketing
activities ... Creating a framework designed to spur private investment in the fields of
infrastructure, development, production and marketing, thereby favouring private investment in
the agricultural sector. Promotion of a set of incentives to encourage the formal private sector to
invest more intensively in this field (livestock). Retrenchment of state monopolies in the
electricity, oil and gas, water, and telecommunications sectors. Make private sector support
programmes more effective.
Central African Republic
Create an institutional and regulatory environment favourable to private initiative … promoting
private sector development … greater mobilization of foreign and domestic private
investment … speed up privatization of the large public enterprises, restructure the cotton
sector … reduction of state role in banking …
Chad
Structural reforms planned for 2000-02 include development of the private sector. Government
divestment of COTONTCHAD. Launching the call for bids for divestment.
Ethiopia
… development of the private sector … encourage private investment … encourage public-
private sector partnership … make the business environment and incentive structure
attractive … development of the private sector … privatizing the second biggest bank
(Table continues)38
Table 6: Privatization and courting of private sector
(continued)
Country Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs
Guyana
Rationalization and streamlining of the public sector. Guyana’s private sector remains
embryonic. To ensure its rapid development and success … government support is essential.
To promote increased private sector participation in the economy, a new securities law will be
implemented … In the public sector, the goal will be the efficient delivery of services to the
private sector by all government ministries and agencies. Government will continue its drive to
complete its privatization programme. The three remaining public enterprises will be
restructured and modernized.
Kenya
The role of the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry has been fundamentally redefined … Its
mission is to ‘facilitate, promote and champion’ the private sector and to create a positive
enabling environment for business … the private sector will be invited to consult with and to
participate along side government in global trade negotiations … The government
acknowledges that private institutions are best suited for implementing investment programmes
and that the role of government needs to be limited to establishing prudential rules … The
ministry recognizes that only the private sector can create value for Kenya’s economy and that
its primary mission is to assure that obstacles and constraints to the process of private sector
value creation are minimized … new privatization strategy (for parastatal reform) … divest the
large infrastructure and service enterprises … (including) the Kenya Pipeline
Company … rationalization of the sugar industry as a prelude to privatization is a priority …
Madagascar
Quickly advance the privatization programme … advancement of the public enterprises
privatization programme… The private sector being considered as the engine of economic
growth … stimulation of national and foreign private investment … privatization of state-run
societies …
Mali
Committed to far-reaching structural reform aimed at promoting private sector activities …
Promote the development of private investment. ... concluding the privatization initiatives
currently under way, especially in the energy, telecommunications and transport
sectors ... encouraging private sector involvement (in housing) ... Bank privatization will take
place in two phases. The role of private sector management units will be strengthened to
enhance the private sector’s contribution to transformation of the economy in favour of the
manufacturing sector.
Malawi
Increase efficiency and broaden ownership base by privatizing public enterprises. Promote
mining by the private sector. Finalize reforms to privatize Malawi Railways. Finalize reforms to
introduce private sector participation in the operation of lake transport facilities. Consolidate
reforms to deregulate the air transport industry and privatize Air Malawi. Initiate work on the
commercialization/privatization of some airports. Improve telecom services and reduce costs by
encouraging private sector participation. Implement reforms to allow for the entry of private
firms into production of electricity.
(Table continues)39
Table 6: Privatization and courting of private sector
(continued)
Country Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs
Mauritania
The structural changes in the Mauritanian economy place the private sector at the centre of
economic development … Private initiative will increasingly drive economic growth. The
government’s objective is to promote the development of a dynamic private sector and to make
the country more competitive and attractive to private foreign investment. State divestiture and
the liberalization of the productive and main infrastructure sectors are offering a considerable
range of opportunities to the private sector … the services sector which should continue to
expand because of sustained and significant private investment in tourism, telecommunications
and trade … the new role assigned to the private sector … increased investment in the energy,
telecommunications and transportation sectors, flowing the privatization of these
sectors … involve the private sector in the financing of infrastructures (refers to road removal,
air transport, maritime transport, oil, gas, electricity).
Nicaragua
Further moves towards a private sector driven market economy …
Tanzania
Implement reforms that will help reduce the excessive cost of utilities (incl. electricity) to
industry.
Uganda
Place greater emphasis ... on the actions which promote private sector development and
therefore contribute indirectly to poverty reduction. Uganda requires a framework within which
the private sector can expand. ... Constraints on private sector competitiveness need to be
removed. Privatization will transfer the need for major investment expenditures on power to the
private sector.
Zambia
Non-mining sectors, continue to implement accelerated privatization programme. Add utilities,
transport companies and financial institutions to the portfolio of Zambia privatization or liquidate
the remaining 50 commercial entities in ZPA portfolio. For public utilities … offer for sale
telecommunications company (ZAMTEL). Discontinue the government’s direct involvement in
retail credit operations and privatize the state-owned enterprises. Develop plans for selling
Zambia National Savings and Credit Bank … government to reduce its majority shareholding in
the oil distribution company (ZNOC) … reform and liberalize the energy (including power)
sector. Commercialize the operations of the electricity company. Encourage large-scale
corporate involvement in the tourism sector. Facilitate private sector activity in supply of maize
and inputs.40
Table 7
Cost recovery, user fee systems and pricing policies for education, health care and water
Country Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs (author’s comments in italics)
Benin Elimination of tuition fees for rural students (p9) (implies a continuation of fees elsewhere)…
Introducing an appropriate pricing policy for water use (in relation to rural areas) (p9).
Burkina Faso
… encourage private sector involvement in meeting health needs (p25) … exemption of
monthly school fees paid by parents of girl students or in the twenty provinces with the lowest
school enrolment (p38) (implies continuation of fees for others) … limiting the impact of health
care costs on the income of underprivileged households (p39) … lowering the cost of
preventative medicine for users … by introducing flexible rates and subsidies (p40) …
government plans to … clearly define the uses to be made of resources generated by cost
recovery at the health district level (p41).
Chad
Increase the participation of local communities in health service operations (p4) … Increase the
participation of civil society in the provision of health care services by gradually introducing a
harmonized system of minimal user fees for certain services (p9) … (education) increase
community participation … examine and define a user cost-sharing policy, particularly at the
secondary and tertiary levels (p10) … not currently include specific measures to protect
vulnerable groups (p12).
Ethiopia
A clear policy framework has also been put in place to allow the active participation of the
private sector in financing and managing education (p20) … The Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation
and Development Fund’s intervention is concentrated in areas like basic education, basic
health, water supply … Beneficiary communities are expected to participate not only in labour
and material contributions, but also in decision making, cost sharing and overall ownership of
schemes (p22).
Guyana
In the area of cost recovery, measures will be taken to free up more resources to improve the
health system … Guyana operates a reimbursable co-payment health insurance programme …
however … rules of reimbursement are not clear and patients pay full medical costs up front…
reimbursement takes an extraordinarily long time … to reverse these constraints, reforms will
be introduced … to (i) extend its area of coverage to include the self-employed (ii) directly
reimburse public hospitals and clinics for medical services; and (iii) publicly issue ratios of co-
payment (p27) (will these reforms make enough difference to poor people?) … (water and
sanitation) implementing a subsidy programme to help poor households connect to the system
and/or pay a portion of their monthly bill … a major objective is to ensure the financial
sustainability of the water sector (p29) (will this assistance make enough difference for poor
people and how compatible is it with the sustainability objective?)
Madagascar
For the water and sanitation sector … cost recovery and rational exploitation of available
resources are yet to organize (p30) … The poor will have facilitated access to health services
thanks to the setting up of pre-payment schemes for risk-sharing purposes and a solidarity
mechanism for the poor as a strategy to supplement the user’s financial participation (p33).
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Table 7: Cost recovery, user fee systems and pricing policies for education, health care and water
(continued)
Country Extracts from PRSPs and I-PRSPs (author’s comments in italics)
Mali
Significant participation by … and users in investment for drinking water infrastructure.
Malawi
Important to introduce a greater level of cost sharing in secondary education with progressive
removal of subsidies on boarding costs in secondary schools ... there is also need to remove
subsidies on tertiary education (p16) … Other initiatives in the health sector include …
introduction and strengthening of cost recovery/user fees. In this regard, all hospitals will be
encouraged to establish fee-paying wards and outpatients departments services for users with
the ability to pay (p18).
Mauritania
Introduce a sustainable primary health cost recovery system based on efficient sharing of costs
among the community, the local governments and the state; (p33) … Promote the cost and fee
recovery system at the secondary and tertiary level (p37).
Tanzania
The government will strategically support cost-sharing, co-financing, and other initiatives aimed
at catalysing deeper involvement of communities and other shareholders in well-conceived
poverty reduction programmes (p22) … Promote the participation of private sector and civil
society involvement in public health services delivery (p43).
Uganda
Health care … The pro-poor implementation of cost-recovery will require the successful
identification of targeting mechanisms, perhaps geographically based (p17) … Water and
sanitation are being supported by major public interventions with communities paying a small
proportion of the investment costs and being responsible for the maintenance of facilities (p17).42
Table 8
Governance and public sector reform
Country Extracts from PRSP or I-PRSP
Benin
… improve governance ... national anti-corruption strategy ... reforming the civil service and
... quickening the pace of decentralization ...
Bolivia
… modernize the state and fight corruption ... reform of the judicial system ... promote the
participation of the private sector in areas previously assumed by the public sector ... reduce
red tape and bureaucracy in public entities, limit discretionality through the transfer of a number
of responsibilities from the public sector ... decentralization ... transfer political power to
municipal governments ...
Burkina Faso
Redefinition of the role of the state ... Promote good governance ... accelerate reforms to
strengthen democratic forums and promote the efficient management and transparency of
government finance ... local governance ... combat corruption ... Refocus the role of the state
on its sovereign tasks and ensure that it has the means to refine its role in the context of
decentralization ... The strategy adopted by the government to reduce poverty in Burkina Faso
presumes that the state will only intervene in the context of a clear definition of its powers and
role as compared with those of civil society and of the private sector. Public intervention will
always be guided by two major motivations: compensating for the market’s shortcomings in the
efficient allocation of resources and seeking social equity ... the state will play a regulatory and
redistributory role ... Good governance has an economic and a political dimension ... reform of
the judicial system ... decentralization ... comprehensive reform of the civil service ... better
management of public finances ...
Central African Republic
Intense fight against corruption and fraud ... create an institutional and regulatory environment
favourable to private initiative ... Introduce decentralized administrative and political structures,
with a view to strengthening democracy, encouraging good governance and fostering wider
participation ... reinforce the rule of law ... clarification of the role of the state in redistributing
growth equitably, with a view to improving both the quality of expenditure and good governance
policy ...
Chad
… continuing and consolidating the democratization process of political and social
life ... (pertaining to health) strengthening the deconcentration/decentralization process
... (pertaining to education) increased decentralization ...
Ethiopia
… decentralization and empowerment, judiciary and civil service reform, and institutional
capacity building. Judicial and civil service reform will have the effect of encouraging private
sector in particular, while decentralization and empowerment will mainly encourage the
smallholder farmer.
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Table 8: Governance and public sector reform
(continued)
Country Extracts from PRSP or I-PRSP
Guyana
Good governance and an improved business environment are essential for accountability,
transparency and the restoration of business confidence ... In the public sector, the goal will be
the efficient delivery of services to the private sector by all government ministries and agencies.
In the short term, government will eliminate redundant positions and reduce vacant positions in
the establishment from over 25,000 to 12,000. ... improving the rule of law ...
Kenya
Good governance is a fundamental building block of a just and economically prosperous
society and therefore, is an essential component of action to reduce poverty. ... A sustained
drive against corruption ... reforming the public service ... Its mandate, structure and operation
are to be reshaped while productivity is raised to more effectively facilitate private sector
activities and lead the battle against poverty ... The operational structure of the entire public
sector will be rationalized and reduced to reflect the functions appropriate to
government. ... reduced workforce ... restructuring and retrenchment ... Completion of the civil
service retrenchment exercise to reduce the service by at least 48,000...In order to restore the
credibility of the public service the moral of “service” to the public together with a work ethic
based on honesty and endeavour will be re-established. ... not just decentralization, but
devolution of powers to local levels of government ... There are strong linkages between
devolution, accountable local governance and the quality of services at the local level. There
will be a deliberate shift to increase the functional responsibilities of local
authorities ... Government is committed to removing itself from business and commercial
activities in the medium term ... To make Kenya more attractive to investors, the government
will take a number of reform actions that should lead to increased transparency in and
accessibility to dispensing justice and ensure the rule of law is upheld.
Mauritania
… good governance ... improvement in the government’s regulatory and redistributive
functions ... consolidation of decentralization ... promote true institutional development based
on good governance and ... full participation ... The government’s mandate has evolved
considerably in Mauritania, following the profound alteration of the economic landscape
resulting from the incessant structural reforms implemented since 1985 that have reduced the
government’s scope for intervention. This evolution has not, however, deprived the government
of its strategic and exclusive role of designing policies and development strategies and of
producing the standards, laws and regulations that regulate economic activity ... more far-
reaching reforms of the legal and judicial framework. Consolidation of the rule of
law ... strengthening of civil service capabilities ... judicial reform...
Madagascar
… reforms in the civil service ... decentralization and the devolution of power in favour of local
government ... combat corruption ... fight against corruption ... reform in the civil service ...
Mali
… creating an enabling regulatory, legislative, and institutional framework; ... strengthening
democracy and the rule of law; implementing the decentralization policy ... public sector
restructuring and privatization ... good governance ... fight to end corruption ...
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Table 8: Governance and public sector reform
(continued)
Country Extracts from PRSP or I-PRSP
Malawi
… civil service reform ... retrenchment of 20,000 temporary employees ... improve financial
management and accountability ... good governance ... decentralization process ... democratic
environment ... rationalizing government ministries, departments, and agencies ... improve
financial management and accountability ...
Tanzania
… shifting the responsibility for formulating, implementing, and monitoring poverty reduction
intervention by the districts, municipalities, and communities ... has started. Improve
effectiveness in the delivery of public services and the overall incentive environment. A
governance system that is efficiently and effectively decentralized.
Zambia
Improve efficiency and reduce cost of public service ...
Uganda
Good governance and security. The public sector’s role is to intervene in areas where markets
function poorly or would produce very inequitable outcomes. ... Good governance is
increasingly recognized as a prerequisite to economic growth and
development. ... consultations with the poor have shown that insecurity is among their most




Country Comments by civil society
Cambodia
Although the I-PRSP contains many references to gender equality and closing the gender gap,
it does not have a clear policy articulation on how women can be integrated into development
efforts and can contribute to poverty reduction. Moreover, although problems such as violence
against women and trafficking are recognized in the I-PRSP, it does not provide concrete
solutions in terms of legislation or relevant policy measures to address these problems (NGO
Forum on Cambodia 2001).
Malawi
… studies have shown that women’s unequal access to markets, e.g. for credit, and their lack
of control over assets such as land and income, mean that they often cannot respond to
economic signals as planners intend. For instance, a study in Malawi shows how women did
not take up the new opportunities presented by the export maize market in the early 1980s,
because they had little access to credit and tended to work the poorest land (Due and Gladwin
1991, quoted in Terry 2001). Such gender inequalities impede the effectiveness of Bank
programmes, even on their own terms.
Tanzania
On the whole, the final PRSP document does not demonstrate any gender perspectives and
civil society inputs in a meaningful way (Tanzania Gender Networking Project).
Uganda
However, while making references to women, the plan has a very weak gender analysis. Plans
do not in themselves overcome existing biases in government policy and practice. For example,
in agriculture, plans for improved extension service make no reference to gender, yet there are
major problems with extension workers targeting male farmers or groups, and ignoring women.
The foundation of a PRSP is the sectoral plan. Government should undertake proper analysis
to understand female and male perspectives on current service delivery and other government
action, and then ensure that policy design and practice is improved in sectoral plans (Burdon
2000).46
Table 10
Countries citing sector as a major growth hope


























Countries implementing a full PRSP:
Uganda from March 2000
Burkina Faso from May 2000
Tanzania from November 2000
Mauritania from December 2000
Bolivia from February 2001
Countries preparing a full PRSP, having already reached decision point:





Guinea Bissau for 4
th quarter 2001
Guyana for May 2001





Mali for June 2001
Mozambique for March 2001





Sao Tome and Principe for 4
th quarter 2001
Senegal for November 2001
Zambia for 2
nd quarter 2001
Countries, which have not yet reached decision point:
Angola I-PRSP for 2
nd quarter 2001
Burundi I-PRSP for 4
th quarter 2001
Central African Republic I-PRSP for 3
rd quarter 2001
Chad PRSP for June 2001
DR Congo no PRSP process
Rep Congo I-PRSP for 4
th quarter 2001
Côte d’Ivoire I-PRSP for 2
nd quarter 2001
Ethiopia I-PRSP for 1
st quarter 2001
Ghana PRSP for April 2001
Kenya PRSP for May 2001
Lao PDR I-PRSP for 1
st quarter 2001
Liberia no PRSP process
Burma no PRSP process
Sierra Leone I-PRSP for 1
st quarter 2001
Somalia no PRSP process
Sudan no PRSP process
Togo I-PRSP for 2
nd quarter 2001
Vietnam I-PRSP for 1
st quarter 2001
Yemen no information on PRSP process
Source: HIPC Debt Strategy, Newsletter Issue 7, 1
st quarter 2001, Debt Relief International (taken from
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